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Abstract
Opponents of the computational theory of mind (CTM) have held that the theory is 
devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to 
account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ 
physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ 
claims rely on a simple mapping account (SMA) of physical implementation. Hence 
defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advo-
cating additional constraints on the implementation relation. However, instead of 
attempting to ‘save’ CTM by constraining the account of physical implementation, I 
argue that the general form of the triviality argument is invalid. I provide a counter-
example scenario, and show that SMA is in fact consistent with empirically rich and 
theoretically plausible versions of CTM. This move requires rejection of the compu-
tational sufficiency thesis, which I argue is scientifically unjustified in any case. By 
shifting the ‘burden of explanatory force’ away from the concept of physical imple-
mentation, and instead placing it on salient aspects of the target phenomenon to be 
explained, it’s possible to retain a maximally liberal and unfettered view of physical 
implementation, and at the same time defuse the triviality arguments that have moti-
vated defenders of CTM to impose various theory-laden constraints on SMA.
Keywords Computational theory of mind · Computational sufficiency thesis · 
Physical implementation · Simple mapping account
1 Introduction
According to the long standing and widely embraced (e.g. Putnam 1967; Fodor 
1975; Newell and Simon 1976; Stich 1983; Pylyshyn 1984; Johnson-Laird 1988; 
Pinker 1997) computational theory of mind (CTM), computation (of one sort 
or another) is held to provide the scientific key to explaining the mind, and in 
 * Paul Schweizer 
 paul@inf.ed.ac.uk
1 Institute for Language, Cognition and Computation, School of Informatics, University 
of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK
 P. Schweizer 
1 3
principle at least, computation provides the basis for the engineering project of 
constructing mental systems artificially. Actual physical devices such as laptops 
and brains perform computations when they implement abstract mathematical 
formalisms. And this immediately raises a question central to the foundations of 
CTM—under exactly what conditions can a physical system properly be said to 
implement a formal procedure? The answer to this question has proved surpris-
ingly elusive and controversial.
A very straightforward and elegant account articulated by, e.g. Block (1978), 
Searle (1980), Hinkfuss (as reported in Lycan 1981), Kripke (1982), Putnam 
(1988), Bishop (2009), is based on a simple mapping between physical structure 
and abstract formalism. Accordingly, a physical system P performs a computation 
C just in case there is a mapping from the actual physical states of P to the abstract 
computational states of C, such that the transitions between physical states reflect 
the abstract state transitions as specified by the mapping. The minimalism, neutrality 
and generality of the simple mapping account (henceforth SMA, adopting terminol-
ogy introduced in Godfrey-Smith 2009 and ‘canonized’ by Piccinini 2015a) make 
it look like a natural choice as the in-principle standard for physical implementa-
tion—it takes the Mathematical Theory of Computation (MTC) as its starting point 
and adds no substantial assumptions. And because it adds no further assumptions 
or restrictions, SMA is in an important sense maximally liberal—there will exist 
abstract mappings from a huge class of physical systems and processes to an equally 
huge class of computational formalisms.
Abstract mathematical structures are multiply realizable (MR), and SMA allows 
for the widest possible reading of this multiplicity. Indeed, one of CTM’s standardly 
conceived virtues is that it can potentially provide a universal theory of cognition, 
a theory which is not tethered to the peculiarities and contingencies of biologically 
bestowed human physiology, and hence is free of the looming stigma of ‘neuro-
chauvinism’. Since mentality is explained in computational terms, and computa-
tional formalisms are multiply realizable, it follows that CTM can be applied to any 
number of different types of creatures and agents. In light of CTM in combination 
with MR, it follows that a human, a Martian and a robot could all be in exactly the 
same mental state, where this sameness is captured in terms of implementing the 
same cognitive computation, albeit via radically different forms of physical hard-
ware. So on this view, computation is seen as providing the scientific paradigm for 
explaining mentality in general.
But rather than heralding multiple realizability as a theoretical virtue promising 
a universal account of mentality, various opponents of CTM target this feature as its 
Achilles heel. A maximally liberal reading of MR has been utilized by critics such as 
Searle (1980) and Putnam (1988), who contend that the theory is thereby rendered 
empirically vacuous. These ‘trivialization’ arguments hold that, a la SMA, a map-
ping will obtain between virtually any physical system and virtually any formalism, 
which in turn is construed as fatally undermining CTM, since whatever computa-
tional procedures are held to account for our cognitive properties and attributes will 
also be realized by a myriad of other ‘deviant’ physical systems. So, not only could 
human mental states be formally sustained in robots and extraterrestrials, but also by 
buckets of water and possibly even stones. Hence the attribution of computational 
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structure to physical systems is deemed conceptually trivial, and devoid of any sig-
nificant empirical content.
This triviality critique is certainly not aimed at a Philosophical Straw Man, since 
a host of authors have responded, including Fodor (1981), Maudlin (1989), Chrisley 
(1994), Chalmers (1996), Copeland (1996), Scheutz (1999), Shagrir (2001), God-
frey-Smith (2009), Sprevak (2010), Milkowski (2013), Rescorla (2014), Piccinini 
(2015b), in an attempt to defend CTM. These defences generally accept the basic 
supposition that an unbridled simple mapping account critically undermines the 
computational theory of mind, and hence they attempt to defend CTM by placing 
additional constraints on the implementation relation, so that it is no longer a simple 
or theoretically neutral mapping. In effect, these restrictions aim to salvage CTM by 
precluding a vast number of physical systems from the domain of the mapping func-
tion, in an attempt to separate ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ implementations from the many 
presumably ‘false’ cases countenanced by SMA. These constraints include: counter-
factual, semantic, causal, functional, and mechanistic.
However, I advance quite a different type of response to the situation. Instead of 
attempting to ‘save’ CTM by constraining the account of physical implementation, 
I argue that, regardless of whether one accepts or rejects SMA, the general form of 
the triviality argument is invalid. I provide a counterexample scenario, and show 
that SMA is in fact consistent with empirically rich and scientifically plausible ver-
sions of CTM. Indeed, no one thinks that SMA ‘threatens’ electrical engineering 
or our ability to design and utilize sophisticated computational artefacts—and the 
Mathematical Theory of Computation is surely not seen as a source of peril by com-
puter scientists and software engineers. So why should a purely MTC based account 
of physical implementation constitute such a theoretical hazard for a computational 
approach to the mind? In my view, it’s a threat only because the widely embraced 
version of CTM which is undermined by SMA is itself flawed and should not be 
accepted in any case.
So I will argue that it is possible to retain SMA as the in-principle standard for 
physical implementation, while at the same time embracing a robust and empiri-
cally plausible rendition of CTM which is not susceptible to the standard trivializa-
tion critiques. The paper will proceed by first analysizing the trivialization strategy 
and arguing that the underlying Computational Sufficiency Thesis (CST) should be 
rejected. I then develop a modified version of CTM that is compatible with SMA, 
and show that this version of CTM could yield an explanatorily rich and scientifi-
cally fruitful account of the mind. Hence the triviality critique is invalidated. I then 
go on to provide some independent considerations in favor of SMA as the global, 
in-principle standard for physical implementation, and argue that those who accept 
CST and hence propose various additional constraints on SMA have inverted the 
picture, and that the ‘burden of explanatory force’ should not be borne by the imple-
mentation relation. I also propose that a genuinely computational account of mental-




2  SMA and Trivialization
Putnam (1988) illustrates the inherent liberality of the simple mapping account 
with a technical proof of the theorem that every open physical system implements 
every (inputless) Finite State Machine (FSM). He provides a generic depiction of 
a physical system as a bounded, continuous region of space–time, and the basic 
idea is that the region is held constant but sliced up in an as many different ways 
as one likes in order to define a sequence of disjunctive ‘physical states’ that can 
be mapped to any given run of a FSM. And Searle famously promulgates the 
universality of SMA with the claim that virtually any physical system can be 
interpreted as implementing virtually any formal procedure. For example, Searle 
(1990) asserts that the molecules in his wall could be interpreted as running the 
WordStar program. The claim is simply put forward with no further defense, but 
Copeland (1996) provides a proof of ‘Searle’s Theorem’, which he observes is 
essentially a notational variant of Newman’s (1928) objection to Russell.
In light of such results, we will accept the crucial ‘trivialization’ premise that, 
given SMA, whatever computational procedures are held to account for our cog-
nitive attributes will also be realized by a myriad of other ‘nonstandard’ physical 
systems. And merely for the sake of convenience, let us suppose the former to be 
some suitably advanced version of Fodor’s (1975) Language of Thought (LOT), 
say LOT*. Hence assume that cognitive scientists eventually endorse LOT* as 
the underlying functional/computational architecture of the human mind, and thus 
hold that the brain serves as a biological implementation of this formal structure. 
And by SMA, a mapping will exist from the molecular activity in, say, Hinkfuss’s 
pail, to this very same formal structure, so that the bucket of water also has a 
level of description under which it serves as an implementation of LOT*.
Given CTM, does it now follow that Hinkfuss’s pail is on a cognitive par with 
the human mind and the trivialization strategy has succeeded? Not without a tacit 
underlying premise in the form of what Chalmers (2012) has dubbed the com-
putational sufficiency thesis (CST). The CST explicitly maintains that merely 
implementing a computational formalism of the appropriate sort constitutes a suf-
ficient condition for mentality in physical systems. So in order to diagnose the 
exact sense in which SMA is supposed to undermine CTM, it is useful to make 
the full structure of the trivialization strategy explicit with the following reductio 
argument:
Premise (1)  Common sense pre-theoretical truth: this bucket of water is not a 
mental system
Premise (2)  CTM (generic version): implementation of the appropriate formal 
architecture is fundamental to the distinctively cognitive status of the 
human brain
Premise (3)  Assumption for the sake of argument: LOT* is the appropriate formal 
architecture fundamental to the distinctively cognitive status of the 
human brain
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Premise (4)  SMA: there is a mapping between this bucket of water and LOT*, so 
the bucket of water is an implementation of the appropriate formal 
architecture for mentality
  But nothing particularly disastrous follows from the above, without 
further strengthening premise 2 with the additional
Premise (5)  CST: any physical system implementing the appropriate formal archi-
tecture for mentality is thereby a mental system.
Conclusion  Therefore, this bucket of water is a mental system, in contradiction 
with premise 1.
Hence what SMA directly threatens, and what has served as the implicit fulcrum in 
the trivialization controversy, is not simply a technical paradigm wherein computa-
tion is deemed to provide the appropriate mathematical framework for a scientific 
study of the mind, just as, say, Hilbert Space is the appropriate mathematical frame-
work for quantum mechanics, and 4-dimensional Minkowski geometry for special 
relativity. Instead, what is threatened is a very specific version of CTM which is 
committed to CST. As above, defenders of CTM typically try to block the reductio 
argument by rejecting SMA along with premise (4). In contrast, I would advocate 
rejecting (5), which is a theoretically objectionable tenet in any case. CST is overly 
simplified and far too strong, and I will argue that the generic rendition of CTM in 
premise (2) should instead be elucidated in a much more expansive and empirically 
plausible manner.
3  CST Rejected
It is worth noting that from a normal scientific perspective, CST appears curious 
indeed. There are many different levels of description and explanation in the natural 
world, from quarks all the way to quasars. But there is no comparable ‘sufficiency 
thesis’ in chemistry, biology, geology, astronomy.1 In other special sciences, inclu-
sion in categories at the relevant level of description is a matter of degree and scien-
tific utility, and often requires conventional choices for applying taxonomical rubrics 
in borderline cases—it’s not a matter of some tidy and uniformly applicable suf-
ficient condition or ‘intrinsic’ property. For example, ‘being a tectonic plate’ is not 
1 An anonymous reviewer has observed that this claim is reminiscent of remarks made in Searle (1980) 
against Strong AI, wherein the latter position is committed to CST. And while there is definitely some 
common ground here, in that I agree with Searle in rejecting CST, the underlying reasons and positive 
stand being endorsed are quite different. Searle has an extremely robust view of Original Intentionality as 
an essential property of minds, and as indicated in an ensuing paragraph, I disagree with Searle on this 
point, and defend a much weaker and ‘operational’ view of the mind in terms of an evolved ensemble 
of cognitive capacities. Searle invokes causal powers because he holds that Original Intentionality is a 
type of unique phenomenon ultimately produced by the causal powers of the brain. In contrast, I do not 
endorse such a ‘reified’ view of mentality, and only hold that salient causal powers are required in order 
to manifest the relevant capacities, rather than to reproduce some elusive organic bi-product.
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considered to be an intrinsic property of the conglomeration of particles categorized 
as such, and this geophysical level of description is not captured by any simple suf-
ficiency thesis.
Similarly there is no ‘cerebral sufficiency condition’ for when an accumulation 
of cells, neurotransmitters, etc. comprise a brain. This is a biologically expedient 
category, but it’s not an intrinsic property of material configurations. However, even 
though there is no simple and tidy sufficiency condition for ‘being a brain’, CST 
nonetheless makes the rather remarkable claim to provide a hard and fast sufficiency 
condition for when such a semi-determinate lump of matter constitutes a mind. And 
I would diagnose much of the disagreement over CTM, the trivialization arguments, 
and concomitant defensive critiques of SMA to be engendered by ill advised alle-
giance to CST. In doing so, the CTM camp places far too great a theoretical (ideo-
logical?) burden on computation.
Why? In this regard it’s relevant to observe that both Searle and his CTM oppo-
nents share a crucial Philosophical commitment regarding what is required of an 
adequate theory of the mind. Part of what motivates acceptance of CST by advo-
cates of CTM is that such theorists apparently view ‘being a mind’ as an intrinsic 
property of certain physical configurations such as the human brain. And this drives 
CST, because it is intended to theoretically capture this feature. Searle also thinks 
that being a mind is an intrinsic property, and this common ground then supplies a 
shared platform for disagreement about the role of computation. Searle argues that 
computation is not intrinsic to physical systems, which he takes to constitute a refu-
tation of CTM, since he holds that the defining mental characteristic of ‘Original 
Intentionality’ cannot be explained by appeal to some extrinsic property or level of 
description.
And I agree with Searle that computation is not intrinsic to physical systems. 
However, this is not enough to refute a more plausible, non-CST version of CTM, 
since I disagree with both Searle and his CST opposition that being a cognitive sys-
tem is an intrinsic property of various arrangements of mass/energy. This is because, 
just as in the case of ‘being a brain’, there is no clean and simple sufficiency condi-
tion—instead it is a question of degree with respect to a number of diverse factors 
and capacities along many different axes, complexity of organization, etc. Bechtel 
(1993) aptly characterizes ‘cognition’ to include all those processes which occur in 
organisms that make it possible for them to acquire information from their environ-
ment and produce actions in response. There is a branching evolutionary continuum 
stretching from amoebas (or even slime mould and bacteria?) through molluscs, 
insects, reptiles, birds, cats, monkeys, dolphins, apes, humans… There is no non-
arbitrary point at which to draw the line which cleanly divides mental from non-
mental. And the situation is made even more nebulous with the contemporary emer-
gence of various forms of Artificial Intelligence.
Hence to return to the claims of CST, how could the mere fact of implementing 
the ‘right’ type of abstract procedure be enough to magically transform a mindless 
arrangement of matter into a genuinely mental system? In contrast, I argue that much 
more is required—the system must be anchored in and interact with the real world 
in a host of rich and multifaceted ways not satisfied by a mere stone or a bucket 
of water. There is a wide spectrum of empirical evidence that must be taken into 
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account, and it is ultimately a matter of gradient with respect to a broad ensemble of 
capacities, rather than just a simple binary yes/no question regarding the satisfaction 
of an abstract and a priori computational definition.2 Indeed, the view that mentality 
is an intrinsic property of certain material configurations would appear to stem from 
(a covert and residual) commitment to the traditional Cartesian view, quite ill suited 
to a contemporary naturalistic framework.
4  Within a Given Explanatory Project the Data Set Matters
In terms of a computationally based science of mind, a number of pragmatic and 
application-specific considerations must come to the fore, to augment the bare and 
theoretically neutral framework provided by MTC and SMA. As in other branches 
of empirical inquiry, the starting point should be the set of data we are attempting to 
explain.3 In the case of a computational theory of mind, various cognitive capacities 
manifested in terms of intelligent behavior, by, e.g., normal humans. These include 
things like language acquisition and use, planning a future course of action, control 
of plan execution, acquiring new non-habitual task behaviors, the alteration of one’s 
actions in non-random correlation with salient properties of objects interacted with 
in the past, capacity for highly structured behavior such as playing games defined by 
rules, etc. (e.g. as in Rupert 2018).
One need not subscribe to behaviorism in order to acknowledge that behavior 
nonetheless constitutes a central and indispensable form of evidence. But CTM’s 
strong traditional aversion to behaviorism seems to have made it curiously myopic 
with respect to the central importance of the phenomena to be explained. On the 
assumption of CST, CTM is so far removed from the relevant data set that its theo-
retical stance is critically undermined by SMA and a bucket of water (!). In con-
trast, one would expect a genuine counterexample to a robust version of CTM to 
be, say, a system that can exhibit the right sort of evidence, but which nonetheless 
can’t be explained through appeal to computational processes (perhaps because its 
full capabilities violate the Church-Turing thesis and transcend the limits of comput-
ability). But rather than being able to address the triviality critique with the obvious 
rejoinder that the bucket of water is irrelevant, because it’s not a cognitive system to 
begin with and exhibits no capacities in need of explanation, defenders of CST must 
2 The same anonymous reviewer has also rightly noted that there appears to be some alignment here 
with the central claims of Embodied, Embedded and Ecological cognitive science. And while I am cer-
tainly not unsympathetic to such views, in the current context I would prefer to simplify the comparison 
with the original CTM targets of the triviality critique, and thus adopt a more traditional view. The cog-
nitive system must be physically implemented and able to exchange concretely specified inputs and out-
puts with the external world, but the respective I/O boundaries demarks the cognitive system per se, and 
the external factors are salient only to the extent that they can condition the inputs to the system (given 
its outputs) in important and complex ways. But the core cognitive processing is still centralized and 
internal.
3 I articulate this as a rather basic principle of theoretical explanation in general. In Shagrir and Bechtel 
(2017) a more specific version/application of this general principle is put forward in the particular con-
text of Marr and Computational explanation.
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instead argue that it isn’t ‘really’ an implementation of LOT*. So the key explan-
atory burden is placed on an ontologically loaded implementation relation, rather 
than being driven by salient aspects of the phenomena under investigation. And as 
will be argued in Sect. 9, this inverts the explanatory picture.
As a provisional, rough-and-ready standard for the purposes of theoretical discus-
sion, it might be thought a good indicator of ‘genuine mentality’ if a system is able 
to pass the linguistic and robotic Total Turing Test (TTT) (Harnad 1991). Clearly a 
stone will never meet this condition and will be ruled out from the start. ‘Deviant’ 
realizations, meant as counterexamples to CTM, are unable to pass even the minimal 
standards of the purely conversational Turing test (TT) of (1950), precisely because 
they lack the ability to manifest evidence in the form of intelligent language use. In 
order to pass the merely verbal TT, the computational device must produce natural 
language sentences as output, and Searle’s wall can’t do this. It may output some 
electromagnetic radiation that we could further interpret as code for the appropriate 
sentences, but then we as observers are performing an extra and essential step of 
interpretation wherein the real cognitive work is done. At least in Searle’s hypotheti-
cal Chinese Room scenario, the set-up has the ability to interactively process the rel-
evant input patterns and produce output in recognizable/readable Chinese syntax—it 
can pass the purely verbal TT.
Hence when it comes to scientific explanation as opposed to merely abstract for-
mal considerations, we will need to place concrete constraints on the specification 
of the inputs and outputs. The ‘symbolic’ formal inputs and outputs require canoni-
cal interpretations in terms of phenomena in the actual world, such as appropriate 
linguistic output in response to input questions. So an initial scientific/pragmatic 
constraint on the domain of the implementational mapping function M is that the 
purely abstract inputs and outputs of the formalism must be the image of concretely 
specified input stimuli and output behavior of actual cognitive systems. So if we let 
M−1(x) informally denote the inverse of the mapping function, then M−1(IF) = IC, 
where IF is the abstract formal input while IC is the actual input stimulus in question, 
and M−1 (OF) = OC, where OF is the formal output while OC is in turn the actual 
output behavior.4
This places very significant restrictions on possible implementations, since sys-
tems that do not exhibit the appropriate IC/OC profiles will be precluded from the 
start. And this is a natural and seemingly obvious strategy, given that our reason 
for utilizing computation as a mathematical tool is to explain a certain category of 
phenomena. Godfrey-Smith (2009) calls the inclusion of concrete inputs and outputs 
the specification of a FSA (finite state automaton) ‘in the broad sense’, and notes 
that it is the reading most favorable to functionalism and CTM. In a somewhat more 
prosaic context, he gives the example that if we wish to depict a coin operated Coca-
cola vending machine in FSA terms, then the inputs will need to be actual coins, and 
the output actual cans of coke. And in this context the syntactic expression ‘cans of 
4 At some point will potentially need a caveat concerning input/output boundaries relative to ‘control 
system’ versus peripherals/transducers. But in principle this should not present a difficulty, once CST is 
rejected and our explanatory project is instead governed by pragmatic scientific constraints.
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coke’ means real cans of coke, and cannot be given deviant interpretations such as 
flasks of vodka or thimbles of tea.
However I would further comment that this specification of a FSA ‘in the broad 
sense’ isn’t just the specification of a FSA simplicitor, but rather is the specification 
of a FSA along with part of its intended interpretation, relative to the pragmatic con-
cerns of certain human agents. And it is worth emphasizing that this is a huge depar-
ture from a global and interest-neutral approach to computation and formal systems, 
and constitutes a very significant and context dependent limitation on the principle 
of Multiple Realizability. The Mathematical Theory of Computation itself places no 
such restrictions on the interpretation of formal syntax. Accordingly, the inputs and 
outputs are purely symbolic, and can be interpreted in any possible manner consist-
ent with the structure of the formalism. So from the perspective of MTC, this initial 
move of requiring that the inputs and outputs assume a chosen concrete identity, is 
comparable to, say, ‘solving’ the Skolem paradox in model theory simply by stipu-
lating that the domain of discourse must be the real numbers.
In contrast to purely formal or mathematical contexts, within the empirical con-
fines of a given explanatory project it is justifiable to restrict the range of application 
to our field of interest, and hence by pragmatic fiat decree that we are only concerned 
with the intended interpretation. However, this doesn’t constitute a conceptually illu-
minating or metaphysically binding constraint on the physical implementation rela-
tion per se, and is not a defensible strategy for blocking non-standard interpretations 
as ‘false’ or ‘non-genuine’ in any deep or interesting sense. Such pragmatic restric-
tions cut no significant Philosophical Ice, and instead merely indicate that these 
other interpretations are not relevant to our particular realm of application.
5  Mesh Between Formal and Causal Structure
The foregoing section has argued that, as a first step, a scientific/explanatory project 
must invoke concrete, domain specific constraints on the salient inputs and outputs, 
in order to mesh with the actual data set. This step is a broad spectrum ‘behavioris-
tic’ calibration with the phenomena under investigation, and will help serve to iso-
late the type of physical systems that we are attempting to explain. Systems such 
as tornados and whirlpools do not exhibit any cognitive input/output capacities and 
hence are filtered out. These systems may be relevant to alternate theoretical endeav-
ors such a classical mechanics or fluid dynamics, but not to cognitive science. In 
turn, other systems such as humans, chimpanzees and advanced computational arti-
facts will fall within the appropriate behavioral domain.
CTM is generally conceived as a theoretical advance over behaviorism, in that it 
is concerned not just with black-box stimulus/response patterns, but crucially, with 
the means by which the inputs are transformed to yield the outputs. Internal process-
ing structure is the hallmark of computational accounts, and hence once the systems 
of interest have been identified in terms of salient behavioral capacities, the requisite 
next step concerns the pathways connecting the inputs and outputs, and hence with 
the mapping between the computational formalism and the internal state transitions 
of the physical system. There are any number of different perspectives and levels for 
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describing the very same physical system, and none of them is objectively privileged 
or fundamental to the system as such—instead it remains a question of human choice 
relative to our interests and goals.
For example, a traditional spring-driven analogue clock can be formally modelled 
at various microphysical levels—at a subatomic level in terms of quantum mechanical 
processes and interactions, and at a higher microphysical level in terms of molecular 
thermodynamics. In the latter case, it could also be described in more abstract func-
tional terms as a temperature detector, where the mean molecular kinetic energy of 
its metallic components tracks the ambient atmospheric temperature. And it can be 
described and modelled at various macrophysical levels as well, such as an intricate 
classical mechanism with states evolving in accord with continuous real valued equa-
tions. It could also be described in more idealized conventional terms, where certain 
selected continuous features are broken into discrete segments and given a chronologi-
cal interpretation. And yet again, this relatively advanced design level stance could be 
ignored, and the object could be given a more rudimentary functional depiction, e.g. 
where its size and inertial properties make it useful as a doorstop.
If we want to model a coin operated coke machine using an FSA, then we are only 
concerned with the concrete device described as a properly engineered and functioning 
coke dispenser, and not in any of the many other possible alternative descriptions of the 
very same physical system. Hence in addition to the initial ‘behavioristic’ specifica-
tion that the inputs are actual coins (in some national currency) and the outputs real 
cans of coke, it is also requisite that the internal causal pathway leading from input 
coin to output coke is respected by the implemenational mapping function M. In other 
words, the individuated physical states comprising the domain of M must correspond 
to the relevant engineered states in the causal chain leading from input to output, and 
the mechanism’s internal physical pathway reflected in the matching state transitions of 
the computational procedure as specified by M.
Similarly, if interpreting the brain as a computational device is to have scientific 
utility, then the ascribed formal structure must correspond to aspects of the relevant 
causal structure i.e. the causal structure that enables it to behave in ways salient to 
its status as a cognitive system, as opposed to a coke machine. So (very generally 
and not at this point worrying about the many intervening levels of description con-
necting bottom-up machinery with top-down cognitively characterized behavior) 
the internal computational pathway mediating formal inputs IF and outputs OF must 
integrate with the physical causal pathway from concrete inputs IC to outputs OC. In 
order to give an explanatory account of the mind-brain, utilizing high level compu-
tational description, we need to treat the brain along the lines of a biologically engi-
neered device comparable to one of our computational artefacts, since many of the 
same kinds of pragmatic constraints will need to be invoked.
6  CTM sans CST
As an illustration, we will again take LOT as a paradigmatic instance of CTM, 
and hence as a prime target for the Putnam-Searle triviality critique. According to 
classical LOT, mental processes are explicitly viewed as formal operations on a 
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linguistically structured system of internal symbols. Additionally, the LOT incor-
porates the belief-desire framework of psychological explanation, which holds that 
an agent’s rational actions are both caused and explained by intentional states such 
as beliefs and desires. On the LOT model, these states are sustained via sentences 
in the head that are formally manipulated by the cognitive processes which lead to 
actions. Hence propositional attitude states are treated as computational relations to 
sentences in an internal processing language, and where the LOT sentence serves to 
represent or encode the propositional content of the intentional state.
And merely for the sake of argument, let us temporarily suppose, as before, that 
cognitive scientists eventually endorse some suitable version of LOT as the under-
lying functional/computational architecture of the human mind, and thus hold that 
the brain serves as a biological implementation of this formal structure. The pro-
posed ‘thought experiment’ is not an attempt to foretell the outcome of future find-
ings, nor to make empirically loaded speculations from the comfort of an arm chair. 
Indeed, my overall goal is not to argue that CTM (of any variety) is in fact the right 
approach—this remains an open question which must be settled by future scientific 
research (and even assuming CTM, it may well turn out that the traditional belief-
desire framework enshrined in LOT will be entirely abandoned by successful theo-
ries, as many have contended). Instead, its conceptual job is merely to provide a 
counterexample to the triviality arguments. So, as long as the envisioned state of 
affairs is a conceptually cogent scenario, it shows that an SMA account of physi-
cal implementation is consistent with the possibility of empirically rich and scien-
tifically fruitful versions of CTM, and hence that the broad-sweeping trivialization 
strategy is logically invalid. For the sake of illustration I use LOT as an exemplar of 
the classical approach, although the result applies to computational architectures in 
general.
The typical human being is able to exhibit intelligent linguistic behavior. Relative 
to the particular explanatory project of cognitive science, our aim is now to explain 
this capacity in terms of the causal powers of the brain when viewed as an organic 
hardware device running LOT as its cognitive software. Thus we are interested in 
the multitude of physical processes taking place inside the skull at the level of physi-
cal organization as a brain, and further we are interested in an even higher level of 
description of the brain as performing computations that account for its cognitively 
salient capacities. Obviously, there would be no scientific value in mere ad hoc map-
pings between LOT and the bare lump of mass/energy occupying the cranial cavity. 
As in the case of computationally modelling a coke machine (and unlike trivializa-
tion exercises), a scientifically significant approach is not free to view this complex 
physical system in terms of brain-irrelevant aspects like cosmic ray bombardment, 
gravitational fields, electron spin, arbitrary molecular kinetics, etc. Although in prin-
ciple many such mappings will be simultaneously possible, a la SMA, a theoreti-
cally fruitful and substantive approach must restrict itself to salient causal factors 
pertaining to the physical system’s time-evolution, when viewed as a brain able to 
produce the type of linguistic input/output patterns under study.
So there will be a myriad of pre-existing and empirically intransigent ‘wet-ware’ 
constraints that the mapping will have to satisfy, in order to respect the salient causal 
structure of brain activity as discerned by neuroscience. The largely independent 
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body of functional and anatomical data would then supply a host of highly non-triv-
ial restrictions on how the physical system itself is characterized and what the mate-
rial state transitions should look like, that are interpreted as implementations, under 
M−1(x), of the abstract computational procedures. Such structural constraints may 
resemble the requirements of a ‘mechanistic’ view of computation, as proposed, 
e.g., by Piccinini (2015a, b), Dewhurst (2018), Mollo (2018), but a vital difference 
is that the current constraints are put forward only relative to a given explanatory 
project that employs computation as a mathematical tool, and not as having anything 
whatever to do with a general theory of ‘real’ computation. Thus the principle dif-
ference is that these structural/mechanistic aspects are not motivated by an attempt 
to provide necessary or sufficient conditions for ‘genuine’ as opposed to ‘spurious’ 
implementations, but rather are driven merely by the explanatory requirements for a 
plausible scientific account of the brain (as in Schweizer 2012). So the constraints 
are fundamentally brain-structural rather than computational, and I do not posit the 
need for mechanistic ‘digits’ and ‘processors’, nor any other rigid or preconceived 
computational restrictions on how the physical system should be depicted. Instead, 
the envisioned constraints are driven purely by a scientific analysis of the brain as a 
physical mechanism.
If a physical system when viewed as a brain were methodically interpretable as 
implementing the LOT, this would entail that the transitions between the various 
neurological states instantiating respective tokens of mentalese symbols obeyed a 
causal progression in accord with the transformation of these symbols as prescribed 
by the abstract computational formalism. Thus, in rather simplistic terms, if the 
currently implemented state of the LOT formalism entails the transition to abstract 
computational state Ai, and if M−1(Ai) is the concrete neurological state Cj, then a 
testable consequence of the theory is that the underlying causal structure of the brain 
will next produce state Cj. And if this were the case, it would provide a scientifically 
fruitful and explanatorily powerful key to organic cognition, because it would con-
stitute a unifying perspective tying together actual brain function and the standard 
belief-desire framework of intentional explanation.5
This abstract computational interpretation of brain activity would also need to 
mesh with the input and output capabilities that we want to explain via the attribu-
tion of internal cognitive structure, e.g. intelligent linguistic performance, as in a 
Turing test. So the computational level of description would have to conform with 
observable input and output patterns, such as sentences in an English (or Chinese) 
conversation, to yield successful predictions of both new outputs given novel inputs, 
and predictions correctly describing new brain configurations entailed by the theory 
as realizations of the appropriate formal transformations required to produce the 
5 In the case of an artifact, such as a coke machine, this type of enterprise mapping causal to compu-
tational structure is obviously much more straightforward, since the physical device was intentionally 
designed with a particular formal blueprint already in mind. In the case of a biologically ’engineered’ 
system such as the human brain, this ’canonical’ top-down perspective is not applicable. Hence for this 
type of (still quite speculative) CTM project to be successful, there would need to be a good deal of 
reflective equilibrium and interplay in depicting both causal and computational levels of description to 
achieve a mutually compatible mesh.
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predicted output behavior. Hence it would have to yield confirmable and fully inte-
grated predictions on two distinct levels of analysis.
As above, there is no ‘cerebral sufficiency condition’ for when an accumulation 
of cells, neurotransmitters, etc. comprise a brain. This is a biologically expedient 
category, but it’s not an intrinsic property of material configurations. And similarly, 
in the present thought experiment, the brain serves as a biological implementation 
of the formal LOT structure, but still, this is not an intrinsic property of the brain as 
a complex biochemical device. It simply means that this particular LOT mapping is 
successful at underwriting predictions of future events at the salient level of descrip-
tion. But the brain can be interpreted as simultaneously implementing any number 
of different computational formalisms, and none is intrinsic. Furthermore, there is 
no reason to believe that the interpretation of the brain as implementing LOT consti-
tutes a unique mathematical solution to the constraint satisfaction problem posed by 
our explanatory aims. Indeed, scientific theorizing is an activity carried out by falli-
ble human theorists, working with severely restricted data, and deploying their own 
limited cognitive resources. Abstract scientific theories are accurate only as a matter 
of degree—they are defeasible approximations corrected and improved over time.
Nonetheless, if the foregoing project were to a large degree accomplished, it 
would have exceedingly non-trivial scientific/empirical value. And this value is not 
in the least undermined by Putnam-Searle type mappings—objections of this kind 
have polemical force only on the assumption of CST. But in light of the many con-
crete empirical constraints and opportunities for testing predictions of both exter-
nal behaviour and internal brain state, the CST is rendered a completely gratuitous 
consideration. There is no single and simple sufficiency condition in this highly 
complex and multifaceted scientific enterprise, and merely implementing the LOT 
does not magically convert matter into mind. On the more scientifically plausible 
version of CTM currently envisioned, computation supplies a successful high level 
mathematical description of the brain for the prediction and explanation of actual 
events, including the production of utterances in some natural language conversa-
tion. In contrast, a tepid bucket of water manifests no actual events in need of cogni-
tive explanation. Thus if faced with the triviality objection that there is nonetheless 
a level of description at which the bucket of water can be interpreted as an imple-
mentation of LOT, the advocate of CTM sans CST can happily shrug and respond—
‘Yes, and so what?’
7  The Computational Stance
In this manner we adopt what could be termed a ‘Computational Stance’ towards 
physical systems (as in Schweizer 2019). This approach is in central ways com-
parable to Dennett’s (1981) Intentional Stance, wherein intentional states such as 
beliefs and desires are not posited as objectively real phenomena, but instead are 
treated as mere ‘calculational devices’ or ‘abstracta’ in Reichenbach’s sense (like 
point masses and perfectly frictionless surfaces in classical mechanics), used to pre-
dict observable events, but without any additional ontological commitments. Analo-
gously, I would construe abstract computational states on a similar footing. In the 
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case of our purpose-built artifacts, these abstract states are idealized formal notions 
that we employ to describe such devices from a higher design-level perspective. 
Classic digital computation is rule-governed syntax manipulation, and as such is no 
more intrinsic to physical configurations than is syntax itself. Furthermore, discrete 
states are idealizations, since the physical processes that we interpret as performing 
digital computations are continuous (in the standard non-quantum case). Thus dis-
crete states do not literally correspond to the underlying causal substrate. We must 
abstract away from the continuity of actual physical processes and impose a scheme 
of conventional demarcations to attain values that we can then interpret as discrete. 
Hence this elemental building block of digital procedures must be projected onto 
the natural order from the very beginning (as Turing observed in 1950), and in this 
respect is a convenient fiction rather than a literal depiction.
Dennett holds that there is no internal matter of fact distinguishing systems 
that ‘really’ possess intentional states from those which do not—the strategy only 
requires us to view the system as if it possessed such states. Hence there is noth-
ing in principle to stop one from depicting a stone as an intentional system if one 
so chooses. In a similar vein, I would argue that there is no deep or metaphysically 
grounded fact regarding whether or not a physical system ‘really’ implements a 
given computational formalism. In the case of artifacts such as my desk top com-
puter, I can gain a huge increase in the ability to predict (and exploit) its future states 
if I adopt a computational stance as opposed to viewing it as a brute physical mecha-
nism. And this is because it has been designed and constructed for exactly this pur-
pose. In contrast, a stone has not been so designed, and the pragmatic value of view-
ing it in computational terms will be rather limited.
Relative to particular goals and design parameters imposed by human engineers, 
in conjunction with known principles of materials science, there can be very tightly 
constrained abstract solutions at particular levels of description, e.g. circuit theory 
(Scheutz 1999). SMA does not imply that such mappings are ‘arbitrary’, and surely 
the impressive success and reliability of our artifacts is not a subjective phenom-
enon. As with Dennett’s Intentional Stance, predictive success is an objective cri-
terion. However, to the extent that success is achieved in the case of our artifacts, 
it ultimately rests upon skilled manipulation of the physical substrate. And the ever 
present possibility of error and malfunction indicates that an abstract computational 
description of this (continuous) substrate is still a normative idealization and not an 
‘intrinsic’ characterization.
In a related and potentially compatible vein, Millhouse (2019) proposes that 
the Dennettian notion of ‘real patterns’ be embraced as the theoretical criterion 
for physical computation. And I would agree that such an approach can provide a 
very useful, yet metaphysically modest, handle for comparing the degree to which 
various computational depictions of physical systems possess potential pragmatic/
epistemic value. Millhouse argues for this approach along the standard motivating 
lines—as a defense against trivialization and the concomitant threat to CTM. In con-
trast, I would advocate relinquishing tacit commitment to CST and then no defense 
is required. The algorithmic simplicity criterion advocated by Millhouse has the vir-
tue of being able to provide an objective formal comparison between computational 
interpretations of physical systems, without needing to invoke the metaphysically 
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dubious (and I would argue, ultimately unsuccessful) standards of the semantic or 
mechanistic approaches. But still, I would see this as a fundamentally pragmatic 
rather than ‘intrinsic’ or ‘realist’ criterion. For a limited span of time and to some 
partial degree of accuracy, the abstract computational description can be used to 
track the underlying causal dynamics of the physical system. Thus (as in Schweizer 
2012) physical implementation is not a binary yes/no question, but rather is a matter 
of degree.
And when it comes to applying our abstract mathematical formalisms to the 
physical world, this sort of criterion is obviously of immense practical value. As 
noted at the outset, electrical engineering is not ‘threatened’ by SMA. And no one 
thinks that interpreting a stone as implementing various formal procedures will pro-
vide us with an epistemic pay-off, and neither will interpreting a bucket of water as 
implementing the LOT provide us with a good explanation of anything. In contrast, 
characterizing a complex physical artifact at the level of circuit theory and applying 
abstract computational ascriptions can be of enormous practical benefit. But there 
is nothing physically or metaphysically privileged about circuit theory as a level of 
description, and it does not preclude alternative characterizations and different com-
putational mappings ascribed to the very same physical system. Hence such prag-
matically ‘favored’ mappings are in no way inconsistent with SMA and the basic 
Computational Stance.6
8  Is Computational Implementation a Necessary Condition?
Searle has forcefully maintained that implementing a computational formalism is 
not a sufficient condition for mentality, and I would agree. The paper has argued that 
much more is required, and that the computational sufficiency thesis, which serves 
as the implicit fulcrum of the triviality debate, should be abandoned by the CTM 
camp. But it may still seem a theoretically significant question, in this broader CTM 
context, to ask whether or not computation nevertheless supplies a necessary condi-
tion? This would appear to still provide serious theoretical traction for a computa-
tional approach to the mind.
However, even Searle can concede that computation is a necessary condition, 
but only vacuously so. Given the liberality of SMA and his attendant trivialization 
critique, any mental system can be interpreted as implementing virtually any com-
putational formalism. So being an implementation is necessary in the rather mun-
dane sense of being unavoidable. This line of reasoning also underwrites Putnam’s 
criticism that if we specify concrete inputs and outputs for the cognitive system, 
as in Sect.  4 above, then CTM collapses into a covert form of behaviorism. This 
is because we can map any computational procedure we like to the intervening 
6 Lee (2018) defends an interesting view of computational ’pluralism’ that also allows multiple com-
putational interpretations. However, the version of ’anti-realism’ that I advocate is purely MTC/SMA 
based, and thus fundamentally concerned with syntactic mappings, whereas Lee’s pluralism is with 
respect to mechanistic versus semantic accounts, neither of which I would endorse.
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physical processes connecting input and output, and thus the attribution of internal 
processing structure adds nothing significant to our explanation. But this line of cri-
tique is itself trivialized by the current observation that SMA is plainly too weak a 
standard for our purposes.
In the confines of a scientifically viable theory of the mind which invokes compu-
tation as its signature mathematical framework, the global and theoretically neutral 
SMA must be augmented by additional factors and domain specific considerations, 
as in the preceding section. Let us label this type of pragmatic and theoretically spe-
cialized approach an Explanatory/Causal Mapping (ECM). It does not purport to 
constitute a global, ‘realist’ account of the physical implementation relation in gen-
eral, but instead supplies a pragmatically filtered subspace of implementations that 
is relevant to our particular CTM project. And thus proffered counterexamples to 
CTM such as stones and buckets of water have been filtered out. An obvious ques-
tion to ask at this point is—does ECM then supply the basis for a necessary condi-
tion for mentality? Does this more empirically plausible, non-CST version of CTM 
entail that any genuinely mental system must fall within the bounds of the pragmati-
cally filtered subspace? If so, then perhaps CTM would possess the virtue of being 
able to identify a type of ‘real pattern’ via the attribution of computational structure.
Hence this would seem to constitute a potentially promising line of inquiry. But 
alas, it turns out that many (if not most) purported cases of computation in naturally 
occurring systems (as opposed to our custom-designed artifacts) fail to meet even 
the minimal requirements of a simple mapping account. This is because they lack 
a detailed mapping function to begin with. In particular, they lack a specification 
of intervening computational state transitions between input and output. There is a 
mapping of inputs and outputs, and there is an intervening physical process connect-
ing them, so that the physical process is in effect treated as ‘computing’ a black-box 
function-in-extension. But there is no algorithmic or abstract procedural detail, and 
hence the formal method by which the function is computed is left entirely unspeci-
fied. Of course, a la Searle and SMA, we could map the intervening physical pro-
cess to any number of different algorithmic pathways, and hence provide the details 
of particular implementations that could be said to compute the behavioristic func-
tion in extension. However, this would serve no purpose in a scientific attempt to 
explain cognitive behavior, and it does not satisfy the requirements of ECM. Unbri-
dled SMA is typically dismissed by those in the CTM camp as being in principle 
too weak a criterion, but quite ironically and perhaps surprisingly, in most cases the 
favored computational account does not even meet the basic SMA requirements.
As Rescorla (2017) rightly observes, in stark contrast with our computational 
artifacts, many cases of purported computation in the natural world, even in the 
specific context of cognitive science, conspicuously lack any intermediate syntactic, 
algorithmic or formal level of description. For a salient case in point exposited by 
Shagrir (2014) (and not canvassed by Rescorla), consider the neural integrator in 
the oculomotor system. The scientific account given is that the system produces eye-
position codes by computing mathematical integration over eye-velocity encoded 
inputs, thereby enabling the brain to move the eyes to the correct position. It seems 
clear that the extensional pairs of eye-velocity inputs converted to eye-position-
outputs in the case of the ocular mechanism can be captured intensionally with the 
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mathematical function for integration. But which algorithm does the brain use to 
compute the integration function, and how are the abstract state transitions entailed 
by the formal procedure mapped to intervening brain states? Unless these details are 
provided, the sense in which computation is involved remains unclear. In the case of 
the visual system, there is compelling reason to view the internal brain process as 
mirroring or calibrating itself with distal factors in order to successfully control eye 
position. But from this alone it does not follow that the explanatory description is 
explicitly computational.7
Rescorla (2017) is overtly sanguine about this general state of affairs. He identi-
fies what he calls three levels of ‘computational’ description: the representational, 
the syntactic and the physical/mechanical, and as above, rightly notes that in the 
case of cognitive systems, the intermediary level of syntax is generally missing. He 
provides the example of mammalian cognitive maps (in rats) as illustration, where 
scientists describe the maps in high level representational terms, and explore rats’ 
neural mechanisms serving as implementations, with no intervening syntactic or 
algorithmic characterization. But again this raises the question—in exactly what 
sense does the physical processes in question implement a well-defined computa-
tional procedure? Or is this just ‘computation’ in an equivocal or purely metaphori-
cal sense?8
I would certainly agree that there are three generally recognized levels of descrip-
tion, but would argue, in accord with the fundamental MTC perspective (along with, 
e.g. Chalmers 2012; Millhouse 2019) that it is a syntactically specified effective 
procedure which constitutes the distinctively computational level. In contrast, the 
physical/mechanical level concerns the particular implementation of the effective 
procedure in question, while the ‘representational’ level concerns the intended inter-
pretation of this procedure. Thus it is the syntactical, algorithmic level which is fun-
damental, and which defines computation as such. So for a properly computational 
description of some system, it is necessary to specify the internal state transitions 
which constitute the algorithmic pathways from input to output, and which indi-
viduate the particular procedure being ascribed. In this respect, the Computational 
Stance differs from Dennett’s original Intentional Stance, in that it should not take a 
macroscopic, black-box perspective on the system—instead, the intervening abstract 
state transitions are integral to the stance, insofar as they track corresponding physi-
cal pathways as specified by the mapping function M(x).
7 Perhaps it will be said that the brain does not implement a classic digital formalism to compute the 
integration function, but rather is performing an analogue computation instead. This is not an implausi-
ble claim, but we would still need to be supplied with the specific details, the actual analogue method by 
which the function is being computed in the brain. For example, the differential analyser is an analogue 
computer, and it works in accordance with well defined principles (Shannon 1941). Similarly in the case 
of purported analogue computations performed by the brain, we would still need to know the specific 
details.
8 Some are inclined to equate ’computation’ with a (usually much vaguer) notion of ’information pro-
cessing’, and so might contend that these are cases of computation in the latter sense. However, in agree-
ment with Piccinini and Scarantino (2010), I would respond that the two notions are not synonymous.
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Classical computation is formal, rule governed syntax manipulation, and a defini-
tional constraint supplied by MTC is that the rules can be followed without any addi-
tional interpretation or understanding. Hence effective procedures can be executed 
without knowing what the ‘symbols’ in question are supposed to mean. Semantics 
and ‘representational content’ are add-ons, and no single or privileged interpretation 
is determined by a particular effective procedure. As a well known example, consider 
a Turing machine intended to compute the values of a particular truth function, say 
inclusive disjunction. The machine itself is a program for manipulating the symbols 
‘0’ and ‘1’ on given input tapes, where ‘0’ is intended to denote False and‘1’ denotes 
True. As such, it can easily be reinterpreted as computing the truth function asso-
ciated with conjunction instead of disjunction, simply by flipping the intended ref-
erence of the manipulated symbols so that ‘0’ denotes True and ‘1’ denotes False. 
There is no independent fact of the matter regarding what these syntactic tokens 
‘really mean’—their referential value is dependent upon a scheme of interpretation 
which is not itself specified or determined by the computational activities of the 
Turing machine. The formal behaviour of the device is the same in either case, and 
the rule governed procedure can be executed with no projected interpretation at all.9
In addition to being multiply interpretable, computational formalisms, as above, are 
multiply realizable. In the purely global and theory neutral case, SMA places no spe-
cial restrictions on the physical domain of the mapping function. However, within the 
context of a computational theory of mind, ECM has been identified as the appropriate 
filter. And this added requirement avoids Putnam’s trivial ‘collapse into behaviorism’ 
critique of CTM, which only works through appeal to SMA. If the story must invoke 
a robust correspondence with the actual causal pathways leading from concrete inputs 
to concrete outputs, then the stance is not behavioristic, but instead is explanatory/
causal, and where computation provides the integrating, high-level mathematical key. 
The ECM approach thus avoids behaviorism, and it also avoids the spectre of neuro-
chauvinism, since there is no stipulation that physically alternative systems could not 
serve as implementations of the same computational blue-print. The behavioral data 
set must remain somewhat regimented, to the extent of manifesting recognizable cog-
nitive capacities, but ECM still allows Multiple Realizability in terms of the causal 
pathways that could serve as implementations of the intervening abstract procedural 
pathways. ECM thus steers a plausible course between the two poles of behaviorism 
and neuro-chauvinism, which Godfrey-Smith (2009) notes has been one of the chief 
theoretical challenges for a computational approach to mentality.
9  Locus of Explanatory Force
It’s important to reiterate that the ECM invocation of causal structure is not imposed 
as a necessary or global constraint on physical implementation per se, and should 
not be conflated with a tacit appeal to general causal, functional or mechanistic 
9 These and related global criticisms of the semantic view of computation are put forward in Schweizer 
(2017).
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accounts of computation in physical systems. On my approach, correspondence with 
causal/functional mechanisms is invoked only with respect to an explanatory theory 
of a particular domain which adopts computation as a formal tool and utilizes test-
able predictions to establish its scientific credence. And this move can be justified 
only by its instrumental utility—it makes no dubious metaphysical claims about 
‘real’ implementation or the ‘intrinsic’ purpose or ‘proper function’ of causal mech-
anisms. Instead such factors are motivated simply by generic aspects of scientific 
explanation (e.g. ability to support testable predictions) and are not philosophical 
stipulations regarding the conditions necessary for supposed ‘genuine computation’ 
in the physical world. Hence, in my view, Piccinini and other mechanists extract 
these features from what is required of a good explanation, and inappropriately 
incorporate them into a global and literal view of physical implementation. In con-
trast, I argue that the explanatory burden should be shifted away from an ontologi-
cally loaded implementation relation (and CST), and instead driven by pragmatic 
concerns stemming from the particular explanatory project at hand.10
Like other branches of mathematics, such as set theory, topology and differential 
calculus, MTC provides a precise, well defined formal tool which can be applied to 
the physical world in a virtually limitless variety of ways. And just like, e.g., ‘being 
a member of a set’, or ‘being the output value of an enumeration function on the 
positive integers’, so too ‘being an implementation of a computational formalism’ is 
not a metaphysically grounded or intrinsic property of physical entities, but rather is 
a highly abstract level of description that we project onto the world according to our 
interests and diverse pragmatic goals. It is founded on an observer-dependent act of 
ascription, upon an entirely conventional correlation between physical structure and 
abstract formalism. Furthermore, this conventional mapping is essentially prescrip-
tive in nature, and hence projects an outside normative standard onto the activities of 
a purely physical device. And I would advocate this type of ‘anti-realist’ pragmatic 
perspective, in lieu of attempts to give overarching semantic, causal or mechanistic 
constraints purporting to distinguish literally ‘true’ from ‘false’ cases.
Pragmatic factors do not need or claim to support global and uniform necessary 
conditions for implementation (and the ever present non-zero probability of error in 
physical systems indicates that there is no fully sufficient condition, either). Different 
operational desiderata will have shifting roles and prominence in different contexts 
of application, and will be satisfied to varying degrees dependent on the goals and 
purposes in question, as well as the state of our technological progress. Computation 
is a highly versatile tool, and there is no single and objective class of phenomena 
that can be isolated as comprising the ‘real’ instances of physical implementation. 
Instead, SMA specifies the maximal and context neutral space of possibilities, and 
varying pragmatic considerations can then be applied to carve out different subsets 
within this space which prove useful or interesting according to our divergent human 
purposes. In short, physical computation is not a natural kind—it is dependent upon 
human convention, interpretation and choice.
10 See Schweizer (2019) for an extended critique of causal and mechanistic accounts.
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Thus for a computational theory of the mind which rejects CST there will be a 
‘conservation of explanatory force’ entailed, in order for the theory to do its scien-
tific job. But a central issue concerns the locus of this explanatory force. One of my 
basic points is that the various causal and mechanistic factors that may be required 
by a scientific theory of some given subject area should be localized within that 
particular explanatory project, rather than promulgated as ‘necessary’ constraints 
used to fetter the in-principle standards of physical implementation. Contrary to the 
spirit of CST, the general concept of physical implementation should not bear the 
explanatory burden—instead the subspace of possibilities relevant to our particular 
endeavor must be isolated by invoking appropriate constraints on SMA. In the case 
of CTM an Explanatory/Causal mapping has been specified to define a pragmati-
cally filtered subspace. And in contrast to current terminological practice, for the 
result to be a clear and unambiguously computational theory of the mind, it is per-
haps a compelling desideratum that ECM provides a necessary condition, and hence 
that the salient algorithmic details be explicitly delineated.
10  Conclusion
The paper has shown that the general form of the SMA-based triviality critique 
is invalid. This move requires the rejection of the computational sufficiency the-
sis, which I’ve argued is theoretically unpalatable for a variety of reasons. In place 
of CST we should adopt a more empirically plausible ECM view on the relation 
between computation and mentality. On this amended version of the CTM para-
digm, it may well turn out to be scientifically profitable to depict the workings of 
actual cognitive systems in computational terms. However, this does not warrant the 
a priori CST stipulation that cognitive systems should be computationally defined. 
Computation per se has no mystical powers of ‘cognitive transformation’, and hence 
the burden of explanatory force should be shifted away from the relation of physical 
implementation, and instead be driven by salient aspects of the phenomenon under 
investigation, as well as by the general requirements of scientific explanation. This 
position is consistent with a maximally liberal and unfettered view of computation 
as an abstract mathematical tool like any other, and at the same time is immune 
to the triviality arguments that invoke the unconstrained and theoretically neutral 
standards of SMA.
Along the way, I’ve also supplied some independent reasons for retaining the 
simple mapping account of physical implementation, and given various criticisms 
of alternative views. However, whether or not one chooses to accept or reject SMA, 
the conclusion nonetheless remains that ‘saving’ (a scientifically plausible version 
of) CTM can no longer be seen as a compelling reason for rejecting SMA, and for 
promulgating more restrictive and less mathematically general views on physi-
cal implementation. And in any case, it is not to be simply assumed that a CTM 
approach, of any variety, will prove to be the successful paradigm in the science of 
human mentality—the definitive nature of the explanatory relation between formal 
computation and human intelligence remains an open question.
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What then are the ramifications of this view regarding the closely associated field 
of Artificial Intelligence? Traditional Strong AI is committed to CST, and hence my 
arguments serve to undermine this type of position for artifacts, just as for humans. 
However, the traditional, intrinsic view of the mind, held by both Searle and propo-
nents of CST, has, in the current discussion, been replaced by a more operational 
analysis, wherein the phenomenon to be addressed is seen as a complex ensemble of 
cognitive capacities. Hence if these capacities could be sustained computationally, 
by a project of Artificial General Intelligence, then such a project should potentially 
be deemed successful, independently of the theories and methods that might ulti-
mately account for such capacities in humans.11
Acknowledgements This paper was originally presented at the IACAP 2018 conference, and I would like 
to thank Ron Chrisley, Joe Dewhurst, Oron Shagrir, and other members of the audience for useful ques-
tions and comments. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive 
feedback, from which the final version of the paper has greatly benefited.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Bechtel, W. (1993). The case for connectionism. Philosophical Studies, 71(2), 119–154.
Bishop, J. M. (2009). Why computers can’t feel pain. Minds and Machines, 19, 507–516.
Block, N. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. In C. W. Savage (Ed.), Perception and cognition. Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? Synthese, 108, 309–333.
Chalmers, D. J. (2012). A computational foundation for the study of cognition. Journal of Cognitive Sci-
ence, 12(4), 323–357.
Chrisley, R. L. (1994). Why everything doesn’t realize every computation. Minds and Machines, 4, 
403–420.
Copeland, J. (1996). What is computation? Synthese, 108, 335–359.
Dennett, D. (1981). True believers: The intentional strategy and why it works. In A. F. Heath (Ed.), Sci-
entific explanation: Papers based on Herbert Spencer lectures given in the University of Oxford. 
Oxford: University Press.
Dewhurst, J. (2018). Computing mechanisms without proper functions. Minds and Machines, 28, 
569–588.
Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. (1981). The mind-body problem’. Scientific American, 24, 114.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009). Triviality arguments against functionalism. Philosophical Studies, 145(2), 
273–295.
Harnad, S. (1991). Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. 
Minds and Machines, 1, 43–54.
Johnson-Laird, P. (1988). The computer and the mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
11 In the present discussion I do not canvass issues regarding the (currently seemingly intractable) phe-
nomenon of conscious qualitative experience, and hence such a stand may not generalize. As a final note, 
Ron Chrisley has brought to my attention the fact that maintaining a scientifically viable version of CTM 
without accepting CST is compatible with some of the remarks he makes at the end of his 1994 paper.
 P. Schweizer 
1 3
Lee, J. (2018). Mechanisms, wide functions, and content: Towards a computational pluralism. British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https ://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy06 1.
Lycan, W. (1981). Form, function, and feel. Journal of Philosophy, 78(1), 24–50.
Maudlin, T. (1989). Computation and consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, 86(8), 407–432.
Milkowski, M. (2013). Explaining the computational mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Millhouse, T. (2019). A simplicity criterion for physical computation. British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science, 70(1), 153–178.
Mollo, D. (2018). Functional individuation, mechanistic implementation: The proper way of seeing the 
mechanistic view of concrete computation. Synthese, 195, 3477–3497.
Newell, A., & Simon, H. (1976). Computer science as empirical enquiry: Symbols and search. Communi-
cations of the ACM, 19(3), 113–126.
Newman, M. (1928). Mr. Russell’s “causal theory of perception”. Mind, 37, 137–148.
Piccinini, G. (2015a). Computation in physical systems. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. http://plato .stanf ord.edu/archi ves/fall2 015/entri es/compu tatio n-physi calsy stems /.
Piccinini, G. (2015b). Physical computation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Piccinini, G., & Scarantino, A. (2010). Computation vs. information processing: Why their difference 
matters to cognitive science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41(3), 237–246.
Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York City: W.W. Norton.
Putnam, H. (1967). The nature of mental states. In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind, and 
religion (pp. 1–223). Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and reality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pylyshyn, Z. (1984). Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science. Cambridge: 
MIT Press.
Rescorla, M. (2014). A theory of computational implementation. Synthese, 191, 1277–1307.
Rescorla, M. (2017). Levels of computational explanation. In T. Powers (Ed.), Philosophy and comput-
ing: Essays in epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, and ethics. Philosophical studies series 
(Vol. 128, pp. 65–84). Berlin: Springer.
Rupert, R. (2018). Representation and mental representation. Philosophical Explorations, 21(2), 
204–225.
Scheutz, M. (1999). When physical systems realize functions. Minds and Machines, 9(2), 161–196.
Schweizer, P. (2012). Physical instantiation and the propositional attitudes. Cognitive Computation, 4(3), 
226–235.
Schweizer, P. (2017). Cognitive computation sans representation. In T. Powers (Ed.), Philosophy and 
computing: Essays in epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, and ethics. Philosophical studies 
series (Vol. 128, pp. 65–84). Berlin: Springer.
Schweizer, P. (2019). Computation in physical systems: A normative mapping account. In D. Berkich 
& M. V. d’Alfonso (Eds.), On the cognitive, ethical, and scientific dimensions of artificial intelli-
gence—Themes from IACAP 2016. Philosophical studies series (pp. 27–47). Berlin: Springer.
Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417–424.
Searle, J. (1990). Is the brain a digital computer? Proceedings of the American Philosophical Associa-
tion, 64, 21–37.
Shagrir, O. (2001). Content, computation and externalism. Mind, 110(438), 369–400.
Shagrir, O. (2014). The brain as a model of the world. In Proceedings of the 50th anniversary convention 
of the AISB, symposium on computing and philosophy.
Shagrir, O., & Bechtel, W. (2017). Marr’s computational level and delineating phenomena. In D. M. 
Kaplan (Ed.), Explanation and integration in mind and brain science (pp. 190–214). New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press.
Shannon, C. E. (1941). Mathematical theory of the differential analyzer. Journal of Mathematics and 
Physics, 20, 337–354.
Sprevak, M. (2010). Computation, individuation, and the received view on representations. Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science, 41, 260–270.
Stich, S. (1983). From folk psychology to cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59, 433–460.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
